Web: http://arxiv.org/abs/2209.14462

Nov. 23, 2022, 2:20 a.m. | Elaine Shi, Hao Chung, Ke Wu

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org arxiv.org

Recent works of Roughgarden (EC'21) and Chung and Shi (SODA'23) initiate the
study of a new decentralized mechanism design problem called transaction fee
mechanism design (TFM). Unlike the classical mechanism design literature, in
the decentralized environment, even the auctioneer (i.e., the miner) can be a
strategic player, and it can even collude with a subset of the users
facilitated by binding side contracts. Chung and Shi showed two main
impossibility results that rule out the existence of a {\it dream} …

cryptography decentralized design

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