Sept. 30, 2022, 1:20 a.m. | Elaine Shi, Hao Chung, Ke Wu

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org arxiv.org

Recent works of Roughgarden (EC'21) and Chung and Shi (Highlights Beyond
EC'22) initiate the study of a new decentralized mechanism design problem
called transaction fee mechanism design (TFM). Unlike the classical mechanism
design literature, in the decentralized environment, even the auctioneer (i.e.,
the miner) can be a strategic player, and it can even collude with a subset of
the users facilitated by binding side contracts. Chung and Shi showed two main
impossibility results that rule out the existence of a …

cryptography decentralized design

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