Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion

ePrint Report: Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion

James Bartusek, Dakshita Khurana, Giulio Malavolta, Alexander Poremba, Michael Walter

We develop a simple compiler that generically adds publicly-verifiable deletion to a variety of cryptosystems. Our compiler only makes use of one-way functions (or one-way state generators, if we allow the public verification key to be quantum). Previously, similar compilers either relied on the use of indistinguishability obfuscation (Bartusek et. al., ePrint:2023/265) or almost-regular one-way functions (Bartusek, Khurana and Poremba, arXiv:2303.08676).

compiler compilers deletion eprint report functions james key michael obfuscation public quantum report simple state verification