Web: http://arxiv.org/abs/2103.03831

Jan. 13, 2022, 2:20 a.m. | George Kadianakis, Theodoros Polyzos, Mike Perry, Kostas Chatzikokolakis

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org arxiv.org

Online anonymity and privacy has been based on confusing the adversary by
creating indistinguishable network elements. Tor is the largest and most widely
deployed anonymity system, designed against realistic modern adversaries.
Recently, researchers have managed to fingerprint Tor's circuits -- and hence
the type of underlying traffic -- simply by capturing and analyzing traffic
traces. In this work, we study the circuit fingerprinting problem, isolating it
from website fingerprinting, and revisit previous findings in this model,
showing that accurate attacks …

fingerprinting tor

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