all InfoSec news
Tor circuit fingerprinting defenses using adaptive padding. (arXiv:2103.03831v2 [cs.CR] UPDATED)
Jan. 13, 2022, 2:20 a.m. | George Kadianakis, Theodoros Polyzos, Mike Perry, Kostas Chatzikokolakis
cs.CR updates on arXiv.org arxiv.org
Online anonymity and privacy has been based on confusing the adversary by
creating indistinguishable network elements. Tor is the largest and most widely
deployed anonymity system, designed against realistic modern adversaries.
Recently, researchers have managed to fingerprint Tor's circuits -- and hence
the type of underlying traffic -- simply by capturing and analyzing traffic
traces. In this work, we study the circuit fingerprinting problem, isolating it
from website fingerprinting, and revisit previous findings in this model,
showing that accurate attacks …
More from arxiv.org / cs.CR updates on arXiv.org
One-shot Empirical Privacy Estimation for Federated Learning
1 day, 7 hours ago |
arxiv.org
Transferability Ranking of Adversarial Examples
1 day, 7 hours ago |
arxiv.org
A survey on hardware-based malware detection approaches
1 day, 7 hours ago |
arxiv.org
Explainable Ponzi Schemes Detection on Ethereum
1 day, 7 hours ago |
arxiv.org
Jobs in InfoSec / Cybersecurity
SOC 2 Manager, Audit and Certification
@ Deloitte | US and CA Multiple Locations
Information Security Engineers
@ D. E. Shaw Research | New York City
Security Officer Level 1 (L1)
@ NTT DATA | Virginia, United States of America
Alternance - Analyste VOC - Cybersécurité - Île-De-France
@ Sopra Steria | Courbevoie, France
Senior Security Researcher, SIEM
@ Huntress | Remote US or Remote CAN
Cyber Security Engineer Lead
@ ASSYSTEM | Bridgwater, United Kingdom