Jan. 5, 2024, 2:10 a.m. | Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos, Carmine Ventre

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org arxiv.org

The Ethereum block-building process has changed significantly since the
emergence of Proposer-Builder Separation. Validators access blocks through a
marketplace, where block builders bid for the right to construct the block and
earn MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) rewards in an on-chain competition, known
as the MEV-boost auction. While more than 90% of blocks are currently built via
MEV-Boost, trade-offs between builders' strategic behaviors and auction design
remain poorly understood. In this paper we address this gap. We introduce a
game-theoretic model …

access auction block builder builders building competition earn ethereum marketplace mev process rewards strategic value

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