March 19, 2024, 4:11 a.m. | Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos, Carmine Ventre

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org arxiv.org

arXiv:2312.14510v3 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: The Ethereum block-building process has changed significantly since the emergence of Proposer-Builder Separation. Validators access blocks through a marketplace, where block builders bid for the right to construct the block and earn MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) rewards in an on-chain competition, known as the MEV-boost auction. While more than 90% of blocks are currently built via MEV-Boost, trade-offs between builders' strategic behaviors and auction design remain poorly understood. In this paper we address this gap. …

access arxiv auction bidding block builder builders building competition cs.cr cs.gt earn ethereum marketplace mev process rewards strategic value

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