Selective Opening Security in the Quantum Random Oracle Model, Revisited

ePrint Report: Selective Opening Security in the Quantum Random Oracle Model, Revisited

Jiaxin Pan, Runzhi Zeng

We prove that two variants of the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transformations are selective opening secure (SO) against chosen-ciphertext attacks in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), assuming that the underlying public-key encryption scheme is one-way secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (OW-CPA). The two variants we consider are $\mathsf{FO}^{\not{\bot}}$ (Hofheinz, Hövelmanns, and Kiltz, TCC 2017) and $\mathsf{U}^{\not{\bot}}_\mathsf{m}$ (Jiang et al., CRYPTO 2018). This is the first correct …

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