Security Analysis of Signal's PQXDH Handshake

ePrint Report: Security Analysis of Signal's PQXDH Handshake

Rune Fiedler, Felix Günther

Signal recently deployed a new handshake protocol named PQXDH to protect against "harvest-now-decrypt-later" attacks of a future quantum computer. To this end, PQXDH adds a post-quantum KEM to the Diffie-Hellman combinations of the prior X3DH handshake.


In this work, we give a reductionist security analysis of Signal's PQXDH handshake in a game-based security model that captures the targeted "maximum-exposure" security, allowing fine-grained compromise of user's long-term, semi-static, and …

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