Polynomial-Time Key-Recovery Attack on the ${\tt NIST}$ Specification of ${\tt PROV}$

ePrint Report: Polynomial-Time Key-Recovery Attack on the ${\tt NIST}$ Specification of ${\tt PROV}$

River Moreira Ferreira, Ludovic Perret

In this paper, we present an efficient attack against ${\tt PROV}$, a recent variant of the popular Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (${\tt UOV}$) multivariate signature scheme, that has been submitted to the ongoing ${\tt NIST}$ standardization process for additional post-quantum signature schemes. A notable feature of ${\tt PROV}$ is its proof of security, namely, existential unforgeability under a chosen-message attack (${\tt EUF-CMA}$), …

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