On the Masking-Friendly Designs for Post-Quantum Cryptography

ePrint Report: On the Masking-Friendly Designs for Post-Quantum Cryptography

Suparna Kundu, Angshuman Karmakar, Ingrid Verbauwhede

Masking is a well-known and provably secure countermeasure against side-channel attacks. However, due to additional redundant computations, integrating masking schemes is expensive in terms of performance. The performance overhead of integrating masking countermeasures is heavily influenced by the design choices of a cryptographic algorithm and is often not considered during the design phase.
In this work, we deliberate on the effect of design choices on …

attacks channel countermeasures cryptography eprint report masking performance post-quantum post-quantum cryptography quantum quantum cryptography report side-channel side-channel attacks terms well-known