Feb. 7, 2024, 5:10 a.m. | Wenjie Liu Panos Papadimitratos

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org arxiv.org

GNSS are indispensable for various applications, but they are vulnerable to spoofing attacks. The original receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) was not designed for securing GNSS. In this context, RAIM was extended with wireless signals, termed signals of opportunity (SOPs), or onboard sensors, typically assumed benign. However, attackers might also manipulate wireless networks, raising the need for a solution that considers untrustworthy SOPs. To address this, we extend RAIM by incorporating all opportunistic information, i.e., measurements from terrestrial infrastructures and …

applications attackers attacks autonomous context cs.cr eess.sp gnss information integrity monitoring opportunity sensors signals spoofing spoofing attacks vulnerable wireless

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