Sept. 21, 2022, 1:20 a.m. | Alvise de Faveri Tron, Stefano Longari, Michele Carminati, Mario Polino, Stefano Zanero

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org arxiv.org

Current research in the automotive domain has proven the limitations of the
CAN protocol from a security standpoint. Application-layer attacks, which
involve the creation of malicious packets, are deemed feasible from remote but
can be easily detected by modern IDS. On the other hand, more recent link-layer
attacks are stealthier and possibly more disruptive but require physical access
to the bus. In this paper, we present CANflict, a software-only approach that
allows reliable manipulation of the CAN bus at the …

attacks automotive data link networks

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