An End-to-end Plaintext-based Side-channel Collision Attack without Trace Segmentation

ePrint Report: An End-to-end Plaintext-based Side-channel Collision Attack without Trace Segmentation

Lichao Wu, Sébastien Tiran, Guilherme Perin, Stjepan Picek

Side-channel Collision Attacks (SCCA) constitute a subset of non-profiling attacks that exploit information dependency leaked during cryptographic operations. Unlike traditional collision attacks, which seek instances where two different inputs to a cryptographic algorithm yield identical outputs, SCCAs specifically target the internal state, where identical outputs are more likely. In CHES 2023, Staib et al. presented a Deep Learning-based SCCA (DL-SCCA), which …

attack attacks channel collision dependency end end-to-end eprint report exploit information inputs leaked non operations plaintext profiling report segmentation side-channel trace