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A Measurement of Genuine Tor Traces for Realistic Website Fingerprinting
April 12, 2024, 4:11 a.m. | Rob Jansen, Ryan Wails, Aaron Johnson
cs.CR updates on arXiv.org arxiv.org
Abstract: Website fingerprinting (WF) is a dangerous attack on web privacy because it enables an adversary to predict the website a user is visiting, despite the use of encryption, VPNs, or anonymizing networks such as Tor. Previous WF work almost exclusively uses synthetic datasets to evaluate the performance and estimate the feasibility of WF attacks despite evidence that synthetic data misrepresents the real world. In this paper we present GTT23, the first WF dataset of genuine …
adversary arxiv attack cs.cr datasets encryption fingerprinting measurement networks predict privacy synthetic tor traces vpns web web privacy website work
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