April 16, 2024, 4:11 a.m. | Alexander Russell, Qiang Tang, Moti Yung, Hong-Sheng Zhou, Jiadong Zhu

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org arxiv.org

arXiv:2404.09442v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: The random oracle methodology has proven to be a powerful tool for designing and reasoning about cryptographic schemes. In this paper, we focus on the basic problem of correcting faulty or adversarially corrupted random oracles, so that they can be confidently applied for such cryptographic purposes.
We prove that a simple construction can transform a "subverted" random oracle which disagrees with the original one at a small fraction of inputs into an object that is …

arxiv basic can cryptographic cs.cr focus methodology oracle problem prove random reasoning simple tool

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