March 10, 2023, 2:10 a.m. | Jason Zhijingcheng Yu, Conrad Watt, Aditya Badole, Trevor E. Carlson, Prateek Saxena

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org arxiv.org

Capability-based memory isolation is a promising new architectural primitive.
Software can access low-level memory only via capability handles rather than
raw pointers, which provides a natural interface to enforce security
restrictions. Existing architectural capability designs such as CHERI provide
spatial safety, but fail to extend to other memory models that
security-sensitive software designs may desire. In this paper, we propose
Capstone, a more expressive architectural capability design that supports
multiple existing memory isolation models in a trustless setup, i.e., without …

access cheri fail foundation interface isolation low may memory restrictions safety security software version

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