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Can Voters Detect Errors on Their Printed Ballots? Absolutely. (arXiv:2204.09780v1 [cs.HC])
April 22, 2022, 1:20 a.m. | Philip Kortum, Michael D. Byrne, Chidera O. Azubike, Laura E. Roty
cs.CR updates on arXiv.org arxiv.org
There is still debate on whether voters can detect malicious changes in their
printed ballot after making their selections on a Ballot Marking Device (BMD).
In this study, we altered votes on a voter's ballot after they had made their
selections on a BMD. We then required them to examine their ballots for any
changes from the slate they used to vote. Overall accuracy was exceptionally
high. Participants saw 1440 total contests, and of those 1440, there were a
total …
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